











Examining the California Cut Score: 
An Empirical Analysis of Minimum 
Competency, Public Protection, 
Disparate Impact, and  
National Standards 








10 North High Street 
Suite 400 






Examining the California Cut Score: An Empirical 
Analysis of Minimum Competency, Public Protection, 







1 This study was made possible through a grant to Monterey College of Law by AccessLex Institute®. AccessLex collects and analyzes data, 
commissions external experts, and collaborates with other organizations to publish and report on the latest data and evidence on critical issues 
facing legal education and access to the profession. Learn more about AccessLex Institute’s research and other initiatives 
at https://www.accesslex.org/. Correspondence concerning this paper should be addressed to: Mitchel L. Winick, mwinick@montereylaw.edu or 
Victor D. Quintanilla, vdq@indiana.edu. Copyright (C) 2020 Monterey College of Law. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3 
II. HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA BAR EXAM’S  
CUT SCORE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6 
 
III. METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
IV. FINDINGS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   36 





I. Executive Summary 
 
The selection of a minimum bar exam passing score (“cut score”)2 shapes the representation 
of racial and ethnic minorities in the legal profession and the quality of access to justice in the 
state.3 California and national policy makers have not had the benefit of detailed exam 
performance data that analyzes the effect of the cut score on race and ethnicity. An empirical 
analysis will show how higher cut scores create disparities within the attorney licensing 
system and how those disparities affect the diversity of new licensees within the legal 
profession. Informed decisions using that data will contribute to the public good.  
 
Because policy makers consider the cut score an important public protection mechanism, this 
study also explored whether the selection of higher cut scores better protected the public from 
attorneys who do not have the minimum competence to practice law. This study analyzed six 
years of American Bar Association (“ABA”) disciplinary data from up to 48 jurisdictions to 
determine how the selection of a minimum cut score affected public protection as measured 
by disciplinary statistics. 
  
 
2 This study’s use of the term “cut score” is equivalent to the California Supreme Court’s use of the term “pass score.” Both terms represent the 
minimum bar exam passing score an examinee must achieve to pass the CBX. 
3 This study used the racial and ethnicity categories in the State Bar of California’s Simulation of the Impact of Different Bar Exam Cut Scores on Bar 
Passage, by Gender, Race/Ethnicity, and Law School Type, Office of Research and Institutional Accountability, March 18, 2020, 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/reports/CA-State-Bar-Exam-Cut-Score-Simulations-Analysis.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2020). In the 
State Bar’s simulation report, the terms Hispanic and Latino were used interchangeably. Thus, this study used the term Hispanic/Latinx, which was 
identical to the terms used in the State Bar of California’s Report Card on the Diversity of California’s Legal Profession, State Bar of California, 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/reports/State-Bar-Annual-Diversity-Report.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2020). This study defined Black 







To conduct the analysis, the study used two data sets. The first data set included 85,727 
examinees who sat for 21 administrations of the CBX from 2009-18 and the race and ethnicity 
of each examinee.4 The second data set included the ABA discipline data from up to 48 U.S. 
jurisdictions from 2013-18 and the cut scores in each jurisdiction.5 
 
Using the first data set, the study determined how the selection of a minimum cut score (1) 
widens or narrows the racial and ethnic impacts of the bar exam and/or (2) alters the racial 
and ethnic composition of new attorneys joining the legal profession. Both historical actual 
and simulated cut scores were analyzed. Using the second data set, this study examined a 






Initial and eventual passing rates differed significantly between racial and ethnic groups, and 
this gap was wider at higher simulated cut scores. For example, the data showed that 
between 2009 and 2018, using California’s 1440 cut score, for every 1,000 White and 1,000 
Black examinees, 805 White examinees eventually passed the CBX, while only 531 Black 
examinees eventually passed. See Figure 8. Similarly, for every 1,000 Asian and 1,000 





4 Simulation of the Impact of Different Bar Exam Cut Scores on Bar Passage, by Gender, Race/Ethnicity, and Law School Type, Office of Research and 
Institutional Accountability, State Bar of California, March 18, 2020, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/reports/CA-State-Bar-Exam-Cut-
Score-Simulations-Analysis.pdf (last visited September 2, 2020). The study team wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Ron Pi, Principal Analyst 
with the State Bar Office of Research and Institutional Accountability, for compiling and formatting the California Bar Exam data set used in this 
study. 
5 Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems 2018, American Bar Association, 





“ . . . selecting a lower cut score would have significantly narrowed the 
achievement gap between Whites and racial and ethnic minorities  
and would have increased the number of newly admitted minority  
attorneys in California .” 
in California.” 
 
“ . . . maintaining a high cut score does not result in greater public 
protection as measured by disciplinary statistics.” 
 
 
A simulation analysis using actual examinee scores confirmed that selecting a lower cut score 
would have significantly narrowed the achievement gap between Whites and racial and ethnic 
minorities6 and would have increased the number of newly admitted minority attorneys in 
California. For example, at 1440, the achievement gap between Whites and Blacks was 27.4 
percentage points. But at a simulated cut score of 1300, the achievement gap between these 
two groups would have been only 14.5 percentage points. This 12.9 percentage point 
difference in the achievement gap at 1440 and 1300 demonstrates a disparate effect of the 








Using the second data set about disciplinary statistics, the study determined that no 
relationship exists between the selection of a cut score and the number of complaints, formal 
charges, or disciplinary actions taken against attorneys in the jurisdictions studied.  
 
In California and other jurisdictions, the standard of protection to be measured by the bar 
exam is the minimum competency for the first-year practice of law. This study establishes that 
maintaining a high cut score does not result in greater public protection as measured by 
disciplinary statistics but does result in excluding minorities from admission to the bar and the 








6 The achievement gap is calculated by comparing pass rate percentages between racial and ethnic groups and is thus expressed as percentage 
points. The achievement gap is the percentage pass rate of the lowest performing group subtracted from the percentage pass rate of the top 




 II. History of the California Bar Exam’s Cut Score 
 
California’s cut score of 1440 was the second highest in the nation until the California 
Supreme Court’s (“the Court”) August 10, 2020 order7 adjusted it to 1390. Although there are 
no clear records, the previous cut score of 1440 was apparently established by the State Bar 
in 1987 or earlier without any standard setting or validity study being conducted.8 In February 
2017, responding to briefs filed by the deans of ABA,9 California Accredited, and California 
Registered law schools10, the Court directed the State Bar to conduct a “thorough and 
expedited study of the exam that would include . . . a meaningful analysis to determine 
whether protection of potential clients and the public is served by maintaining 1440 as the 
pass score.”11 
 
On September 13, 2017, the Court received the first of seven separate reports related to the 
CBX, “Final Report on the 2017 California Bar Exam Standard Setting Study.”12  
 
7 Order Concerning Modification to the California Bar Examination, Supreme Court of California, August 10, 2020, 
https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/internal_redirect/cms.ipressroom.com.s3.amazonaws.com/262/files/20207/20200810121225776.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 2, 2020). 
8 Supreme Court issues letter relating to In re California Bar Exam, California Courts: The Judicial Branch of California, California Courts Newsroom, 
October 18, 2017, https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/news/supreme-court-issues-letter-relating-to-in-re-california-bar-exam (last visited Aug. 16, 
2020). See also Case, Susan M., The Bar Examiner, Volume 81 (June 2012) at p. 30. “Validity in testing refers to the extent to which the test score 
reflects the attribute you are intending to measure. In the bar exam, validity means ensuring that you are testing what a newly licensed lawyer needs 
to know. Multiple testing methods are used because each method has strengths and weaknesses, and each is designed to test somewhat different 
skills, each of which is believed to be important for the practice of law. The pass/fail standard is set at a level that is believed to protect the public 
from applicants who lack the requisite knowledge and skills to be licensed to practice. Scores that are unreliable cannot be valid. However, validity 
requires more than just reliability; it is not enough to be consistent if you are consistently measuring the wrong thing.” 
9 Deans from ABA Accredited Law Schools, Letter to the Supreme Court of California, “RE: The California Bar Exam,” February 1, 2017, https://www-
cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/2.1.17.LTRtoCalSupCt.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2020). 
10 Deans from CA Accredited and CA Registered Law Schools, Letter to the Supreme Court of California, “RE: The California Bar Exam—Adjustment 
to the Minimum Passing Score,” September 11, 2017, http://montereylaw.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/CALS-2nd-Letter-Brief-to-Supreme-
Court-FINAL-2.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2020). 
11 Supreme Court issues letter relating to In re California Bar Exam, supra note 8. 
12 State Bar of California, Letter to the Supreme Court of California, “RE: Final Report on the 2017 California Bar Exam Studies,” September 12, 
2017, https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/communications/CA-State-Bar-Bar-Exam09122017.pdf. (last visited Aug. 16, 2020). The 
study “utilized a modified version of the Analytic Judgment Method, a method used in the field of licensure, and involved the participation of twenty 
court-selected subject matter experts (SMEs).  The study required the panel of SMEs to evaluate and rate a collection of bar exam essay and 
performance test answers from the July 2016 exam using a baseline definition of minimum competence.  After the SMEs analyzed bar exam written 
responses and were trained to sort them by distinguishing those reflecting at least minimal competence from those that did not reflect minimal 
competence, Dr. [Chad] Buckendahl separately analyzed the actual scores given to such responses during the July 2016 exam scoring process to 
assess exam responses that were deemed minimally competent.  Dr. Buckendahl then derived estimated overall bar exam scores based on the 
actual scores associated with written responses deemed minimally competent and concluded that the median score associated with the SMEs’ 
determination of minimal competence was 1439.” The study was widely criticized for ignoring the Multistate Bar Exam (MBE), providing confusing 
instructions to the panel, and reporting recommendations which did not match the panelists’ understanding of their work. The Department of 




Following the release of this report, the Court responded to the requests filed by the law 
school deans and other public interest groups with a decision not to lower the cut score of 
1440 at that time, but to await the completion of the other studies. However, upon completion 
of these studies, the Court stated that it would “consider any appropriate recommendation to 
revisit the pass score.”13  
In response to the Court’s directive, the State Bar completed the following additional studies: 
 
• A historical analysis of CBX pass rate trends from 2008, 2012, and 2016 by law school 
type, using median LSAT scores at the time of admission. The study found that 
“approximately 20 percent of the decline in bar exam pass rates could be attributable 
to changing applicant abilities. However, the lack of individual student performance 
data limited the ability to identify a causal connection between changes in applicant 
abilities and bar exam passage rates.”14 
 
• A Law School Performance Study. A second Bolus study, completed in 2018, 
“examined changes in the characteristics of students taking the California Bar Exam to 
provide a better understanding of the declining trend of the bar passage rates. The 
study found that changes over time in the characteristics of exam takers accounted for 
between 20 and 50 percent of the decline in bar exam performance during the study 
period. The study was unable to account for a substantial amount of the decline in 
pass rates, concluding that other unexamined factors have contributed to the decade-
long decrease in bar exam performance.”15 
 
• A content validation study to assess the alignment of bar exam content with the 
abilities, skills, and job-related knowledge needed by an entry-level attorney, according 
to a national attorney job analysis. The study suggested that the exam’s content and 
cognitive complexity were consistent with job-related expectations of entry-level 
attorneys based on the generalized national job analysis. The study also suggested 
that the exam’s relevance for skills needed by California entry-level attorneys could be 
 
“minimum competence for the first-year practice of law”—the standard they were supposed to be applying—before evaluating papers. The 
completion of a job analysis, specific to California attorneys, on which to base the definition of minimum competence, was also strongly 
recommended. See Montez, T., Observation of the Standard Setting Study for the California Bar Exam, 
https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/admissions/Examinations/Tracy-Montez-ReviewBarExamstudy.pdf. (last visited Aug. 31, 2020) (See 
Table 1’s Comments/Feedback on items 10 through 16 and Chapter 2). 
13 Supreme Court issues letter relating to In re California Bar Exam, supra note 8. 
14 California Bar Examination Studies, 2017 Studies, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Admissions/Examinations/California-Bar-Examination/California-Bar-
Examination-Studies, (last visited Sept. 29, 2020) summarizing Bolus, Roger, Recent Performance Changes on the California Bar Examination, 
Research Solutions Group, February 19, 2017. See also Report to the Supreme Court of the State of California, Final Report on 2017 California Bar 
Exam Standard Setting Study, September 12, 2017, https://perma.cc/AX4R-28SA (last visited Sept. 24, 2020). 
15 California Bar Examination Studies, Law School Performance Study, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Admissions/Examinations/California-Bar-
Examination/California-Bar-Examination-Studies, (last visited Sept. 29, 2020) summarizing Bolus, Roger, Performance Changes on the California Bar 
Examination: Part 2, Dec. 20, 2018, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/admissions/Examinations/Bar-Exam-Report-Final.pdf (last 




better assessed following a California-specific attorney practice analysis.16 
 
• A California Attorney Practice Analysis that studied the knowledge and skills needed 
for entry-level attorneys. The study collected detailed, empirical data about how 
attorneys use their knowledge and skills to perform routine tasks in the practice of law. 
A working group, with members selected by the Court from state and national 
stakeholder groups, oversaw the study. The working group’s final report contained 
recommendations designed to bring the CBX into closer alignment with the current 
practice of law for entry-level attorneys in California.17 
 
• A Differential Item Functioning Analysis that studied the potential differential impact of 
exam questions by race, gender, and other factors. Examining 20 bar exams from July 
2009 to February 2019, the study found no major areas of concern, but recommended 
further action to continue improving the exam by eliminating sources of differential 
impact.18 
 
In March 2020, responding to a request from the California Accredited Law Schools (“CALS”), 
the State Bar of California’s Office of Research and Institutional Accountability released 11 
years of bar administration data to this study team to conduct an empirical analysis of whether 
higher cut scores: (1) have a disparate impact on diversity in the legal profession and (2) 
better protect the public from attorneys who do not have the minimum competence to practice 
law.19  
 
On May 15, 2020, this study, the seventh related to the CBX, “Examining the California Cut 
Score: An Empirical Analysis of Minimum Competency, Public Protection, Disparate Impact, 
and National Standards,” received approval for funding from AccessLex Institute. 
 
 
16 Buckendahl, Chad W., Conducting a Content Validation Study for the California Bar Exam, ACS Ventures, October 4, 2017, 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/admissions/Examinations/CBEStudy_Attachment_A.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2020). 
17 California Attorney Practice Analysis Working Group, The Practice of Law in California: Findings from the California Attorney Practice Analysis and 
Implications for the California Bar Exam, State Bar of California, May 11, 2020, 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/reports/2020/California-Attorney-Practice-Analysis-Working-Group-Report.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 
2020). 
18 MacLeod, Dag and Nuñez, Amy, Report on and Approval of Recommendations Regarding the California Bar Exam Studies, State Bar of California, 
May 14, 2020, http://board.calbar.ca.gov/docs/agendaItem/Public/agendaitem1000025918.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2020). (Report starts on 
page 56). 
19 Simulation of the Impact of Different Bar Exam Cut Scores on Bar Passage, by Gender, Race/Ethnicity, and Law School Type, supra note 4. The 
report compiled archival data from 21 bar exams administered over a span of 11 years, from 2009 to 2019 and conducted a simulation analysis of 
test-takers’ pass rates by gender, race/ethnicity, and law school type for the simulated cut scores 1300, 1330, 1350, 1390 and the actual cut 




In June 2020, while this study was underway, the Court lowered California’s cut score to 
1390.20 The Court’s July 16, 2020 letter to the State Bar explained that its decision was 
“based on findings from recently completed bar examination studies as well as data from 
ongoing studies,” and that it would “consider any further changes pending recommendations 
offered by the forthcoming Blue-Ribbon Commission on the Future of the California Bar 
Examination.”21  
 
This study team concluded its analysis in August 2020 and submitted its findings to the 










20 California Supreme Court Issues Order Finalizing Lower Passing Score for Future Bar Exam Takers, California Courts: The Judicial Branch of 
California, California Courts Newsroom, October 18, 2017, https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/news/california-supreme-court-issues-order-finalizing-
lower-passing-score-for-future-bar-exam-takers (last visited Aug. 16, 2020). 
21 Supreme Court of California, Letter to the State Bar of California, “RE: California Bar Exam,” July 16, 2020, 
https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/internal_redirect/cms.ipressroom.com.s3.amazonaws.com/262/files/20206/SB_BOT_7162020_FINAL.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 16, 2020). 
22 The study team thanks and acknowledges the members of the advisory committee who advised the team on the report analysis and findings 
(summary bios are included at the end of this report): Dean Emerita Joan Howarth, Dean Kevin Marshall, Joanna Mendoza, Dean Jennifer Mnookin, 
Professor Jerry Organ, Chris Punongbayan, Dean Daniel Rodriguez, and Professor Gary S. Rosin. The team also thanks and acknowledges Dean 




 III. Methodology  
 
This study focused on three things: (1) the extent to which racial disparities and achievement 
gaps widen or narrow at distinct cut score thresholds; (2) the extent to which these racial and 
ethnic disparities affect diversity of newly admitted attorneys in the legal profession; and (3) 
the relationship, if any, between minimum cut scores and rates of attorney discipline. 
 
To analyze achievement gaps, disparate impact, and diversity in the profession, this study 
examined data from 21 administrations of the CBX during the 11 years between February 
2009 and February 2019. This data set included a total of n = 143,198 bar exams taken, 
including n = 85,727 unique examinees. Because the data set included each applicant’s 
complete examination history, including the applicant’s performance data for any subsequent 
attempts to pass the CBX across the 11-year period, the study team focused the unit of 
analysis on examinees, not exams. This meant that when conducting analyses using the data 
set, the study team counted each examinee only once, even if the examinee took the CBX 
multiple times. This change was important because by restructuring the data this way, the 
study team was able to avoid any artificial inflation in the total number of examinees who sat 
for the CBX across the period studied.23 
 
To simulate whether applying other cut scores widened or narrowed racial or ethnic 
disparities and achievement gaps in California, the study focused on the selection and impact 
of the following cut scores: 1300, 1330, 1350, 1390, and 1440.24 The study determined 
whether each examinee in the data set would have passed the CBX on any given attempt at 




23 The data revealed that minorities were more likely to fail the exam on their first attempt, which meant they often took the CBX multiple times. Thus, 
to get an accurate picture of the racial and ethnic background of all examinees who sat for the exam across the 11 years, the study team counted 
each examinee only once. By viewing data restructured this way, the study team was able to avoid any artificial inflation in the total number of 
examinees who sat for the CBX across the 11 years. This is the first known study of its type to evaluate the characteristics of discrete exam takers, 
rather than groupings of examinees that include repeat takers counted multiple times in the data sets.  
24 The five cut scores used in this study were selected based on the following criteria: 1440 was California’s previous cut score; 1390 is California’s 
current cut score; 1350 is the median cut score used in the United States; 1330 is New York’s current cut score, which is a jurisdiction that is similar 





Finally, to evaluate whether there was any valid relationship between cut scores and rates of 
attorney discipline, the study team collected and analyzed the publicly available reports of the 
ABA Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems (“S.O.L.D.”).25 Data from the ABA’s reports on 
attorney discipline complaints, charges, and actions were used as a proxy for measuring the 
risk of potential public harm caused by incompetent or unethical attorneys. The study 
analyzed the most recent six years of ABA disciplinary reports available (2013-18) from up to 
48 jurisdictions to determine whether a higher cut score correlated with reduced harm to the 
public, as measured by discipline statistics.26 
 
Using this large data set, the study investigated whether a state’s selection of a given cut 
score correlated with any of the three indicators: (1) the number of complaints members of the 
public made against attorneys; (2) the number of lawyers charged after probable cause 
determinations; and (3) the number attorneys subject to public or private disciplinary action. 
The study treated each state’s annual reporting as a separate observation and standardized 
each of the three indicators to compare the information across jurisdictions by placing each in 











25 Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems 2018, American Bar Association, supra note 5. 
26 The study team was unable to evaluate the discipline impact of a 1390 cut score because no state used that cut score during the period of the 
data set.  
27 The same results were obtained using many different ways of combining the data. In short, the results were statistically robust. Also, based on the 
study team’s survey of existing research, there appears to be no previously published study, in California or elsewhere, that uses such extensive 




 IV. Findings 
 
 
A. Combining Across Years: Racial and Ethnic Demographics Among Bar Applicants 
 
The study first examined racial and ethnic demographic trends in the population of examinees 
during the period studied.  
 
Between 2009 and 2018, the number of examinees who sat for the CBX ranged from 11,525 
to 12,599 per year.  Over the 11 years, 85,727 unique examinees sat for the CBX. Of these 
85,727 examinees, 48,917 were White (57.1%), 4,117 were Black (5.2%), 18,510 were Asian 
(21.6%), and 9,166 were Hispanic/Latinx (10.7%). 1,384 individuals (1.6%) identified as 
Other.28 Because examinees who selected “Other” represented such a small group of 
individuals, this study focused on whether the cut score disparately impacted Blacks, Asians, 
Hispanic/Latinxs, and Whites. See Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. The Percentage of White and Minority  






28 State Bar of California’s Report Card on the Diversity of California’s Legal Profession, State Bar of California, 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/reports/State-Bar-Annual-Diversity-Report.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2020). Other is defined as “Other 
Race, Ethnicity, or Origin” that is not American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Black/African American, Hispanic/Hispanic/Latinx, Middle Eastern/North 




When analyzed across the 11-year period, the proportion of White examinees declined from 
57.25 percent to 48.21 percent while the proportion of examinees in every other identified 
racial and ethnic group increased. Hispanic/Latinx examinees increased to 15.29 percent 
from 9.87 percent, Asian examinees increased to 24.71 percent from 21.52 percent, and 
Black examinees increased to 7.51 percent from 5.82 percent. See Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Proportion of Examinees Based Upon  
Racial and Ethnic Group Membership Across Time 
 
 
During these 11 years, the population of California shifted from majority White to majority 
minority.29 Although not as dramatic as the shift in overall population, by 2018, a similar 
transition to majority-minority is reflected in the proportion of bar examinees, as shown in 
Figure 2. White examinees represented fewer than 50 percent of the examinees sitting for the 
CBX in 2018 for the first time in the period studied. It is important to note that the increased 
number of minority CBX examinees correlated with increased and improved diversity 
initiatives that resulted in more minorities successfully completing their legal education and 
qualifying to sit for the CBX.30  
  
 
29 Johnson, Hans; McGhee, Eric; and Mejia, Marisol Cuellar, California’s Population, Public Policy Institute of California, April 2020, 
https://www.ppic.org/publication/californias-population/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2020). 
30 Stetz, Mike, Most Diverse Law Schools, The National Jurist, Winter 2019, https://law.ucdavis.edu/news/files/Most-Diverse-Law-Schools-Article-The-






“ Despite the increase of minority examinees sitting for the CBX over the 
period studied, the California attorney licensee population does not 
reflect the state’s demographic diversity.” 
 
 
B. Combining Across Years: Racial and Ethnic Demographics of Passers of the CBX, and 
Impact on the Profession 
 
The study next examined whether the percentage increase in the diversity of examinees over 
an 11-year period resulted in a similar increase in the diversity of bar passers and “never 
passers” (those never passing the CBX during the period studied).  
 
Despite the increase of minority examinees sitting for the CBX over the period studied, the 
California attorney licensee population does not reflect the state’s demographic diversity. In 
2019, the attorney licensee population was still 68 percent White and 32 percent minorities.31 
Although the number of Asians, Hispanic/Latinxs, and multiracial licensed attorneys 
increased over the past 30 years, the number of Black licensed attorneys has remained 
“stagnant.”32 The State Bar of California’s Report Card on the Diversity of California’s Legal 

















31 State Bar of California’s Report Card on the Diversity of California’s Legal Profession, supra note 28 at p.7. The State Bar’s Diversity Report stated 
that over the past thirty years, the “proportion of newly licensed Black attorneys has remained stagnant,” the “proportion of Hispanic/Latinx 
attorneys has doubled from 5 to 10 percent” and the “proportion of new licensees who are Asian or multiracial [has] more than tripled,” but “the 
rapid growth in the number of Asian attorneys, which began in the 1990s, has since leveled off.”  
32 Id. 




Figure 3. The 2019 State Bar of California Diversity Report Card34 
 
To further examine why licensed minorities have not followed the demographic trends in 
California’s population or the upward trend in the number of minority CBX examinees, the 
study analyzed the proportion of examinees persistently failing the exam between 2009 and 
2018 by race and ethnicity (the group the study referred to as “never passers”). 
 
 




C. Between 2009 and 2018, the Number of Examinees Never Passing the CBX has 
Increased 
 
Pass/fail analysis revealed that the proportion of examinees failing the bar exam each year at 
the 1440 cut score increased over time from 44.4 percent in 2009 to 57.8 percent in 2018. 
(Stated conversely, the proportion of examinees passing the bar exam has fallen from 55.6 
percent to 42.2 percent).35 Although the underlying reasons for this trend are debated, the 
identification of proportional pass rates within the groups of eventual passers and never 
passers proved valuable to a better understanding of the effect of the cut score. 
 
An examination of the data between 2009 and 2018 by examinee discloses that any given 
examinee could retake the exam once, or multiple times, and in doing so could eventually 
pass the exam on a later attempt. Thus, this report uses the term “eventual pass rate” to 
define the number of examinees who passed the CBX on their first-attempt or any 
subsequent attempt. “Never passers” or its equivalent describe the examinees who never 
passed the CBX during the period studied, whether they took the exam only once and failed, 
or took it many times but never passed.36 
 
Examining the data in this way, the study calculated that the percentage of applicants who 
passed the bar exam the first-time or eventually at the 1440 cut score was 75.8 percent. At 
the same time, 20,735 (24.2%) unique examinees never passed the exam within these 11 
years of exams.37 See Figure 4. 
  
 
35 Bolus, Roger, Performance Changes on the California Bar Examination: Part 2, Research Solutions Group, December 20, 2018, 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/admissions/Examinations/Bar-Exam-Report-Final.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2020). Passage rates on 
the CBX have declined steadily over the past decade. A 2017 study (Bolus, 2017) found that between 2008 and 2016, the percentage passing the 
exam declined from 62% to 44%–a drop of 18 percentage points. The reasons for the decline have been subject to extensive debate. Some 
stakeholders have attributed the decline to changes in the examination and its grading, others have argued that changes in the qualifications and 
credentials of bar examinees may have contributed. Still others have suggested that additional factors explaining this decrease in pass rates may 
include changes in law school curriculums or shifts in undergraduate educational practices or technology. 
36 A state-sponsored licensing exam ought to be maximally valid and reliable the first time an examinee takes it. Such an exam would screen out 
examinees not minimally competent (eventual non-passers) on the first attempt and fail no examinees with the competence required to meet the 
standard. Without changing the testing instrument or process, an examining body can achieve this with the choice of cut score.  
37 This empirical research project distinguishes between first-time passers, eventual passers, and never passers.  See Jane Yakowitz, Marooned: An 




Figure 4. Combining Across Years: Overall Bar Passage  




D. Between 2009 and 2018, the Percentage of Minorities Never Passing the CBX was 
Higher Than Whites 
 
Racial and ethnic disparities existed between groups never passing the CBX. Of these never 
passers, 49 percent were minorities (10% Black, 25.5% Asian, and 13.5% Hispanic/Latinx) 
while only 46 percent were Whites. The remaining examinees selected “Other” or did not 
respond. See Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5. Combining Across Years: Distribution of  








“ Wide disparities existed between racial and ethnic groups passing and  
not passing the CBX each year.” 
Conversely, of the eventual passers, 60.6 percent were White and only 33.8 percent were 
minorities (3.6% Black, 20.4% Asian, and 9.8% Hispanic/Latinx). The remaining examinees 
selected “Other” or did not respond. See Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Combining Across Years: Distribution of  




Wide disparities existed between racial and ethnic groups passing and not passing the CBX 
each year.  Figure 7 shows an overall decline in bar passage percentages across all groups 
over time, including White examinees and Asian examinees. However, Black examinees 
consistently passed at a lower rate than any other racial and ethnic group, followed by 
Hispanic/Latinx examinees. The minority group with the highest passage rates across the 
years was Asian examinees, but this group’s eventual passage percentages were still 











Figure 7. Bar Passage Rates and Racial and Ethnic Disparities Across Years 
 
 
Figure 7 shows that the 1440 cut score, over the past 11 years, has consistently produced 
disparate passing rates among examinees of different racial and ethnic backgrounds. If an 
examination was objective, although there may be variation on each individual exam 
administration, the percentage passage rates would be expected to equalize over time and 
administrations, assuming a large enough data set.38 However, these data revealed a 
consistent pattern in bar passage percentages over 21 administrations where minorities 
always passed at a significantly lower percentage than Whites.  
 
Longitudinally, among examinees from 2009-18, 80.5 percent of White examinees eventually 
passed the bar exam. In contrast, only 53.1 percent of Black examinees eventually passed 
the bar exam during this period. Hispanic/Latinx and Asian examinees eventually passed the 
bar exam at rates of 69.5 percent and 71.5 percent, respectively. Over these 11 years, every 
minority group eventually passed at a rate at least 9 percentage points lower compared to 




38 Reeves, Richard and Halikias, Dimitrios, Race gaps in SAT score highlight inequality and hinder upward mobility, Brookings, February 1, 2017, 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/race-gaps-in-sat-scores-highlight-inequality-and-hinder-upward-mobility/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2020). “In a 




Figure 8. Combining Across Years: Racial and Ethnic Disparities  
at the Current 1440 Cut Score -- Eventual Passage 
 
 
Figure 8 shows that for every 1,000 White and 1,000 Black examinees, 805 White examinees 
eventually passed the CBX, while only 531 Black examinees eventually passed. Similarly, for 
every 1,000 Asian and 1,000 Hispanic/Latinx examinees, 715 Asian and 695 Hispanic/Latinx 
examinees eventually passed the CBX. 
 
These results may be characterized as predictive because of the long data window, variation 
among groups, and size of the subject pools examined in each group. Figure 9 shows the 
percentage of eventual passers and never passers by race and ethnicity. 
 
Figure 9. Combining Across Years: Racial and Ethnic Disparities  

































Over the 11 years studied, California’s 1440 cut score disparately affected minority 
examinees. Minorities passed at significantly lower percentages compared to Whites both for 
individual exam administrations and across the period studied. Over these 21 administrations, 
there appeared to be a consistent relationship in aggregate between an examinee’s race and 
ethnicity and the examinee’s probability of eventually passing the CBX. Put simply, the data 
revealed that White examinees had a much higher chance of passing the CBX at 1440 
compared to minorities. From Figures 7, 8, and 9, it may also be seen that as the percentage 
of minority examinees increased, the impact of the 1440 cut score was likely one of the 
factors contributing to the overall decline in passage rates. 
 
E. The 1440 Cut Score’s Disparate Impact on Minorities: Simulating Impacts on Diversity 
in California’s Legal Profession of Alternative Cut Scores 
 
This study also simulated how cut scores used by other major jurisdictions would impact (1) 
racial and ethnic disparities and (2) the diversity of new admittees to California’s legal 
profession.  
 
1. Simulation 1: The Effect of Cut Scores on Racial and Ethnic Disparities Among 
Eventual Passers and Non-Passers of the CBX 
 
To determine if the selection of a cut score impacted the eventual passage rate and never 
passage rate, the study simulated how specific cut scores–1300, 1330, 1350, 1390, 1440–
would have impacted passage by these examinees. The study restructured the data to 
analyze whether each examinee eventually or never passed the CBX across the 11-year 
period at each of the different cut scores.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the total number of examinees eventually passing increased as the cut score 
decreased. For example, 75.8 percent of examinees passed at 1440 whereas 80.2 percent 
passed at 1390, and 86.0 percent of examinees passed at 1350, the national median cut 
score. Correspondingly, the never-passer rate fell from 24.2 percent at 1440, to 19.8 percent 
at 1390, and to 14.0 percent at 1350.  
 
When analyzed by racial and ethnic groups, the number of examinees eventually passing 






Figure 10. The Effect of Bar Exam Cut Scores on Racial and Ethnic Disparities 
 
 
While every racial and ethnic group’s performance would have improved with the selection of 
a lower cut score, the data show that the eventual pass rates of minority examinees increased 
at a much higher rate compared to Whites, particularly for Hispanic/Latinx and Blacks. Figure 
10’s steeper lines for minorities compared to Whites as the cut score changed from 1440 to 
1300 in the simulation mean that selecting a lower cut score would have had a greater impact 
on the proportion of minorities eventually passing the CBX and joining the legal profession. 
 
The largest step-increase in minority eventual pass rates occurred when selecting 1350 as 
the cut score as evidenced in Figure 10 where the line is the steepest between 1390 and 
1350. In Figure 10, the lines come closest together at 1300. This represented the greatest 
narrowing of the achievement gap between Whites and minorities. 
 
This simulation of eventual pass rates by race and ethnicity across the data set strongly 
suggests the 1440 cut score has resulted in a negative racial disparity. Adjusting the cut score 
to national normative levels would decrease this effect.  
 
Figure 11 shows eventual passers and never passers by race and cut score. Taking all other 
factors out of the equation, Figure 11 clearly illustrates how selection of the cut score would 
have widened or reduced the achievement gap among racial and ethnic groups at different 





Figure 11. The Effect of Bar Exam Cut Scores on Racial and Ethnic Disparities 
 
 
This simulation of eventual pass rates by race and ethnicity strongly suggests the previous 
cut score of 1440 and current cut score of 1390 result in a greater racial disparity in those 
admitted to the legal profession in California when compared to the national median cut score 
of 1350 and the lower cut scores of 1330 and 1300.  
 
Based on this simulation analysis, had the Court’s recent decision to reduce the cut score to 
1390 been in place throughout the period studied, it would have reduced the achievement 
gap, but only by 2.7 percentage points. This means that between 2009 and 2018, if the cut 
score had been 1390, the top performing racial and ethnic group would have passed the bar 
exam at 84.4 percent, while the lowest performing racial and ethnic group would have passed 
the bar exam at 59.7 percent; a racial and ethnic impact gap of 24.7 percentage points 







Selection of 1350, the national median cut score, would have narrowed the racial and ethnic 
achievement gap between the top performing and lowest performing racial and ethnic groups 
by 8 percentage points, to 19.4 percentage points. The achievement gap would have been 
27.4 percentage points at 1440, 24.7 percentage points at 1390, and 19.4 percentage points 
at 1350.39  
 
As shown in Figure 12, if the cut score were 1330, the achievement gap between the top 
performing and lowest performing racial and ethnic groups would have narrowed by 9.4 
percentage points to an achievement gap of 18 percentage points. 
 
If the cut score were 1300, the achievement gap between the top performing and lowest 
performing racial and ethnic groups would have narrowed by 12.9 percentage points to an 
achievement gap of 14.5 percentage points. See Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. The Achievement Gap Between Top Performing and  
Lowest Performing Racial and Ethnic Groups by Bar Exam Cut Scores 
 
 1440 1390 1350 1330 1300 
Achievement Gap 27.4 24.7 19.4 18 14.5 
Percentage Points the 
Achievement Gap 
Narrowed Compared to 
the Previous Cut Score 
N/A 2.7 5.3 1.4 3.5 
Percentage Points the  
Achievement Gap 
Narrowed  
When Compared to 1440 
N/A 2.7 8 9.4 12.9 
Percentage Points the 
Achievement Gap 
Narrowed When 
Compared to 1390 




39 This narrowing of the achievement gap by 29.3 percent is calculated by subtracting the achievement gap at 1350 (19.37%) from the prior 




Figure 11 and Figure 12 show the narrowest achievement gap in this analysis is at the 1300 
cut score, where the lowest performing group would eventually pass at a 79.2 percent rate, 
and the top performing group at a 93.7 percent rate.40  
 
Figure 13 includes the passage percentage of each racial and ethnic group at each cut score 
to show how the achievement gap between minorities and Whites closed as the cut score 
lowered. 
 
Figure 13. The Effect of Bar Exam Cut Scores on Narrowing  
Racial and Ethnic Achievement Gaps 
 
Figures 11, 12, and 13 also showed the greatest step difference in eventual passage rates 
occurred when the cut score changed from 1390 to 1350, where the achievement gap 
narrowed by 5.3 percentage points. The next greatest narrowing of the achievement gap was 
when the score was changed from 1330 to 1300 (a difference of 3.5 percentage points in the 
achievement gaps).  
 
This study demonstrated that the selection of a lower cut score would have narrowed the  
racial and ethnic disparities in eventual passage rates during the period studied. Insofar as  
 
 
40 Currently, only six states have a cut score of 1300 or lower: Alabama, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Wisconsin. See NCBE 
Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements 2020, Chart 10 at p. 36-37. 




diversity in the profession is a significant value, as the State Bar of California has indicated 
that it is,41 cut score policy makers need to recognize that the choice of the cut score is 
impinging upon our collective ability to achieve those goals. See Figure 14.  
 
Figure 14. The Effect of Bar Exam Cut Scores on 
Narrowing Racial and Ethnic Achievement Gaps On the CBX 
 
 
At 1390, the number of examinees eventually passing the CBX would have increased by 
3,760 examinees. Of these examinees, 1675 would have been additional attorneys of color; 
294 additional Black attorneys, 501 additional Hispanic/Latinx attorneys, and 880 additional 
Asian attorneys. 
 
At 1350, the number of examinees eventually passing the CBX would have increased by 
8,734 (65,006 at 1440 to 73,740 at 1350). Of these 8,734 examinees, 3,876 would have been 
attorneys of color; 753 additional Black attorneys, 1,162 additional Hispanic/Latinx attorneys, 
and 1,961 additional Asian attorneys.  
 
 
41 The State Bar of California, Letter to the Supreme Court of California, “RE: Amended Cover Letter to the Final Report on the 2017 California Bar 
Exam,” September 14, 2017, https://perma.cc/AX4R-28SA (last visited Sept. 24, 2020). The State Bar recognized that “a Standard Setting Study is 
only one data element relevant to the ultimate policy decision to establish a pass line.” In its final report to the Court, it outlined “the key issues 
relevant to a decision by the Court,” which included inter-related issues of “public protection, access to justice, and diversity.” See also Promoting 





At 1330, the number of examinees eventually passing the CBX would have increased by 
10,564, and California would have had an additional 4,665 attorneys of color: 912 additional 
Black attorneys, 1,379 additional Hispanic/Latinx attorneys, and 2,374 additional Asian 
attorneys.  
 
At 1300, the number of examinees eventually passing would have increased by 12,907 and 
an additional 5,793 attorneys of color would have joined the legal profession: 1,154 additional 
Black attorneys, 1,709 additional Hispanic/Latinx attorneys, and 2,930 additional Asian 
attorneys. 
 
2. Simulation 2: The Effect of Exam Cut Scores on Diversity in the Legal Profession 
 
The second simulation analyzed how the selection of a cut score would alter the inflow and 
overall number of newly admitted racial and ethnic minorities to the legal profession in 
California.42   
 
Figure 15 shows how the cut score has a powerful in-group impact on the number of newly 
admitted racial and ethnic minorities in the legal profession. 
 
Figure 15. The Effect of Bar Exam Cut Scores on Relative  




42 This study did not examine lawyers exiting the legal profession. Rather, the research focused on new licensees and how this inflow of new 




While all racial and ethnic groups would have passed the CBX at higher percentage rates if 
1350 had been adopted as the cut score in 2009, the most significant in-group percentage 
increase would have been with Black lawyers.  
 
If 1390 had been adopted as the cut score in 2009, the number of newly licensed Black 
lawyers would have increased by 12.5 percent. Similarly, if 1350 had been adopted as the cut 
score in 2009, the number of additional Black lawyers would have increased by 32.1 percent. 
Finally, if 1300 had been adopted as the cut score in 2009, the number of additional Black 
lawyers would have increased by 49.2 percent.  
 
For Hispanic/Latinx, at 1390 the number of newly licensed attorneys would have increased by 
7.9 percent. At 1350 and 1300, the increase would have been 18.2 percent and 26.8 percent, 
respectively. For Asians, at 1390 the number of newly licensed attorneys would have 
increased by 6.7 percent. At 1350 and 1300, the increase would have been 14.8 percent and 
22.1 percent, respectively.  
 
To analyze how these inflows of newly admitted attorneys would have altered the overall 
number of racial and ethnic minorities in the legal profession, this study combined this 
simulated analysis with the prior analysis reported by the State Bar on diversity within 
California’s legal profession.43 The results are shown in Figure 16. 
 









“ . . . cut scores significantly impact the number of minorities admitted to 
the California Bar. This difference varies among racial and ethnic groups 
and has historically affected the diversity of new applicants to the 
California legal profession.” 
 
 
There was a total of 190,609 active lawyers in California in June 2020.44 The State Bar 
reported that 68 percent of these active lawyers were White, 4 percent were Black, 13 percent 
were Asian, and 7 percent were Hispanic/Latinx. As such, in June 2020, there were 
approximately 129,614 White lawyers; 7,624 Black lawyers; 13,343 Hispanic/Latinx lawyers; 
and 24,779 Asian lawyers in California.45 
 
Had 1390 been adopted as the cut score in 2009 and maintained throughout the period 
studied, California would have added 294 Black lawyers, for a total of 7,918 Black active 
lawyers in California, which would have been a 3.9 percent increase. There would also be an 
additional 501 Hispanic/Latinx lawyers and 880 Asian lawyers, increasing these totals to 
13,844 Hispanic/Latinx active lawyers and 25,659 Asian active lawyers in California, 
respectively a 3.8 percent increase and 3.6 percent increase. 
 
Had 1350 been adopted as the cut score in 2009, California would have an additional 753 
Black lawyers, a 9.9 percent increase. Relatedly, the change would reflect an 8.7 percent 
increase (+1,162) in the total number of Hispanic/Latinx lawyers in California, and a 7.9 
percent increase (+1,961) in the total number of Asian lawyers in California. 
 
Had 1300 been adopted as the cut score in 2009, this change would have resulted in an 
increase of 1,154 additional Black lawyers, a 15.14 percent increase. Similarly, the change 
would reflect a 12.8 percent increase (+1,709) in the total number of Hispanic/Latinx lawyers 
in California, and an 11.8 percent increase (+2,930) in the total number of Asian lawyers in 





44 Attorney Demographics, The State Bar of California, https://members.calbar.ca.gov/search/demographics.aspx (last visited June 22, 2020). This 
study used the 2020 California Attorneys Demographics data to represent the effect that a lower cut score would have had on California’s racial and 
ethnic diversity if it had been adopted between 2009 and 2018. If the period studied also included the examinees who took the CBX in 2019, it is 
likely that a lower cut score would have resulted in more attorneys of color joining the profession. 




Figure 17. The Number of Attorneys in California in June 2020 
by Race and Ethnicity and Cut Score 
 






























Thus, Simulation 2 revealed that cut scores significantly impact the number of minorities 
admitted to the California Bar. This difference varies among racial and ethnic groups and has 
historically affected the diversity of new applicants to the California legal profession. 
 
F.  There is No Statistically Significant Relationship Between Cut Scores and Attorney 
Discipline According to the ABA’s Discipline Data 
 
A commonly heard argument is that high cut scores protect the public by screening out  
unethical or incompetent attorneys.46 The ABA, as the national organization that provides The 
 
46 This note will briefly address how other articles that studied whether bar exams and cut scores protect the public compare to this study. The 
article “The High Cost of Lowering the Bar” concluded there was a correlation between California’s cut score and attorney discipline [Anderson, 
Robert and Muller, Derek T., The High Cost of Lowering the Bar, 32 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 307 (2019)]. However, the results should 
be read with caution. Because Anderson and Muller did not have access to the bar exam scores of the attorneys in their study, they used “each 
lawyer’s law school to estimate his or her Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) score, and the estimated LSAT score to estimate his or her bar exam 
score.” This meant that the study’s conclusions were largely based on hypothetical data and required the assumption that every attorney’s LSAT 
score would predict his or her MBE score and bar exam score, which would include the score on the written portion of the exam. Unlike the 
Anderson and Muller study, this study used a large sample of actual bar exam scores and data from the ABA’s S.O.L.D. reports in determining that 
there was no correlation between actual discipline steps (complaints, charges, and actions) and cut scores. In addition, as argued by Merritt in her 
article “Bar Exam Scores and Lawyer Discipline,” [Merritt, Deborah J., Bar Exam Scores and Lawyer Discipline, (June 3, 2017), 
https://www.lawschoolcafe.org/2017/06/03/bar-exam-scores-and-lawyer-discipline/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2020)], Anderson and Muller’s causal 
inference between the bar exam and attorney discipline should be read with caution for two reasons. “First, as Anderson and Muller point out, 
‘[t]here is virtually no discipline in the first 10 years of practice.’ If the bar exam measured qualities related to attorney discipline, one would expect 
to see disciplinary cases emerge during those 10 years. . . .Second, attorney discipline almost never rests on lack of knowledge about legal 
doctrine, poor reasoning skills, or bad writing–the skills currently measured by the bar exam.” As Leslie Levin, Christine Zozula, and Peter Siegelman 
stated in their 2013 article, A Study of the Relationships between Bar Admissions Data and Subsequent Lawyer Discipline, “. . .  
attorneys most often received discipline for failing to communicate with clients (20.0%), lack of diligence (17.93%), and failure to safeguard client 
property (11.26%). Only 4.14% of disciplinary sanctions related to ‘competence’–and even some of those cases may have reflected incompetence 
in areas that are not tested by the bar exam.” See Levin, Leslie C. and Zozula, Christine and Siegelman, Peter, A Study of the Relationship between 
Bar Admissions Data and Subsequent Lawyer Discipline (March 15, 2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2258164 (last visited Sept. 24, 2020). 




Model Rules of Professional Conduct, selected three measures—complaints filed, charges 
filed, and the number of disciplinary actions—as the standard for assessing attorney behavior 
and regulation. The ABA’s Center for Professional Responsibility “is the only organization that 
collects, analyzes and compiles statistics about lawyer regulatory systems on a national 
basis.” This data is published in the Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems (S.O.L.D.) and 
“serves to educate the public, the profession, the news media, courts and disciplinary 
agencies about sanctions imposed, caseload, budget and staffing activity in each 
jurisdiction.”47 Using this data, the second part of this study examined whether the selection of 
a high cut score reduced the number of complaints filed,48 attorneys charged,49 or attorneys 
subject to disciplinary action.50   
 
The analysis used six years of disciplinary data from up to 48 U.S. jurisdictions from 2013-18 
and explicitly tested for correlation between cut score and rates of discipline. The precise 
number of states reporting to the ABA varied by year, but all 51 jurisdictions (including 
Washington, D.C.) reported some disciplinary data to the ABA, usually the number of public 
 
Does the Bar Exam Protect the Public? (May 28, 2020) Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3612481]. The article stated that “lawyers 
admitted on diploma privilege receive public sanctions at similar rates to lawyers admitted after passing the bar exam for the first decade of their 
careers, but small differences emerge after a decade, and larger differences emerge after two decades.” The article concluded that within 25 years 
of bar admission the public sanctions could increase by 0.1% to 2%, which would impact a small number of attorneys. In contrast, this study 
evaluated discipline data by jurisdiction cut score from up to 48 different jurisdictions (instead of one jurisdiction) to determine that no correlation 
existed. 
47 Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems 2018, American, supra note 5. Because “the Survey has been used by courts and disciplinary agencies to 
effect changes in caseload management, staffing, and funding of their lawyer disciplinary systems. . . it is essential that the Center maintain accurate 
data with respect to each jurisdiction.” 
48  Id. When synthesizing this information in the S.O.L.D., the ABA defines a complaint as “Any information received by the disciplinary agency 
regarding lawyer conduct that requires a determination as to whether the disciplinary agency has jurisdiction over the lawyer or matter(s) 
complained of, or whether sufficient facts are alleged that would, if true, constitute misconduct. These complaints are sometimes called grievances 
or requests for the investigation of a lawyer. These complaints may be in the form of a written submission, e-mail submission, a telephone or in-
person discussion whose contents are reduced to writing, or other information received by the disciplinary agency, including written, audio or visual 
media reports, records of criminal convictions, etc.” See 2016 Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2016sold_results.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2020) at 66. 
49 Id. at 66. Within these reports, the ABA defines a charge as “After a determination has been made that there is probable cause to believe that 
misconduct occurred, any document, pleading or notice filed by the disciplinary agency or appropriate authority with the designated adjudicatory 
tribunal, wherein a lawyer is charged with specified acts of misconduct and violations of the rules of professional conduct and a disciplinary sanction 
is sought.” 
50 Id. Within these reports, the ABA defines a disciplinary action as “. . .lawyers receiving private /non-public disciplinary sanctions[and] lawyers 
publicly disciplined.” Private/non-public sanctions are defined as “Any disciplinary sanction where the identity of the lawyer sanctioned is kept 
confidential. Such private sanctions may include censure, admonition or reprimand. In cases where a lawyer receives a private sanction, a 
description of the conduct for which that lawyer has been disciplined, without disclosing the name of the lawyer, may still be published for the 






“ Based on the analysis of the ABA disciplinary data by jurisdiction, no 
statistically significant relationships between the selection of a cut  
score and any of the three disciplinary indicators were observed.” 
and/or private disciplinary actions taken in the jurisdiction that year.51  
 
According to the State Bar “. . . the principal concern in setting any cut score must be public 
protection” and “. . . the only currently available proxy for public protection is discipline data.”52 
Based on the analysis of the ABA disciplinary data by jurisdiction, no statistically significant 
relationships between the selection of a cut score and any of the three disciplinary indicators 
were observed.  
 
1. Complaints Brought by the Public Against Attorneys  
 
For six years of disciplinary data from up to 48 U.S. jurisdictions, there was no statistically 
significant negative relationship between the selection of a cut score and complaints brought 
by members of the public. See Figure 18.53       
  
 
51 Specifically, between 2013 and 2018, the number of jurisdictions reporting the complaints received was: 45 in 2013, 47 in 2014, 48 in 2015, 48 
in 2016, 46 in 2017, and 46 in 2018. The number of jurisdictions reporting the lawyers charged was: 42 in 2013, 46 in 2014, 48 in 2015, 46 in 
2016, 44 in 2017, and 45 in 2018. The number of jurisdictions reporting the lawyers privately disciplined was: 37 in 2013, 36 in 2014, 38 in 
2015, 35 in 2016, 34 in 2017, and 35 in 2018. The number of jurisdictions reporting the lawyers publicly disciplined was: 44 in 2013, 45 in 2014, 
48 in 2015, 48 in 2016, 46 in 2017, and 47 in 2018. Specifically, between 2013 and 2018, the number of jurisdictions reporting the complaints 
received was: 45 in 2013, 47 in 2014, 48 in 2015, 48 in 2016, 46 in 2017, and 46 in 2018. The number of jurisdictions reporting the lawyers 
charged was: 42 in 2013, 46 in 2014, 48 in 2015, 46 in 2016, 44 in 2017, and 45 in 2018. The number of jurisdictions reporting the lawyers 
privately disciplined was: 37 in 2013, 36 in 2014, 38 in 2015, 35 in 2016, 34 in 2017, and 35 in 2018. The number of jurisdictions reporting the 
lawyers publicly disciplined was: 44 in 2013, 45 in 2014, 48 in 2015, 48 in 2016, 46 in 2017, and 47 in 2018. The team harnessed the ABA’s 
Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems to collect all the available data for each state within the ABA’s reports for years 2013 - 2018. Several states 
were not accounted for in these ABA reports in particular years. To be as exhaustive and complete as possible for this data analysis, the team 
gathered discipline data from official reports located on these state websites. As a robustness check, and to ensure that including additional states 
do not affect the overall results of the study, the data was analyzed with and without these particular data points. The conclusions do not change, 
and the beta/slope relationship between bar exam cut score and discipline across these criteria consistently suggest no negative relationship. 
Complaints, charges, and disciplinary actions taken against lawyers do not decrease with higher bar exam cut scores. R-squared values remain 
trivially small, suggesting that including or excluding these data points has no effect on the overall findings. 
52 The State Bar of California, Letter to the Supreme Court of California, “RE: Amended Cover Letter to the Final Report on the 2017 California Bar 
Exam,” supra note 41. “First, and most importantly, the principal concern in setting any cut score must be public protection. However, no clear 
measure or definition for public protection in the context of a licensing exam has been established. Through the course of this study we have 
learned that the only currently available proxy for public protection is discipline data, problematic on many fronts, most especially because an exam 
governing entry into the practice is not intended to be predictive of future misconduct.”    
53 In Figure 18, as well as Figure 19 and 20, every black dot on the chart represents a state that uses the cut score appearing on the X axis. The 




Figure 18. Linear Fit and R2 Value for the  
Number of Complaints Filed per 1000 Lawyers from 2013-1854 
 
 
2. Charges Filed After Probable Cause 
 
The data also did not show a statistically significant negative relationship between the 
selection of a cut score and the number of attorneys formally charged after a finding of 
probable cause. Thus, at least according to disciplinary statistics, higher cut scores did not 
correlate with increased protection of the public from incompetent or unprofessional 
attorneys. See Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19. Linear Fit and R2 Value for the  









3. Disciplinary Action Filed Per 1,000 Lawyers 
 
Finally, the study did not observe a significant negative relationship in the data between the 
selection of a cut score and the number of attorneys disciplined in a jurisdiction. Unlike the 
analysis of complaints and charges filed, the relationship between cut score and disciplinary 
action was linear, with the same rate of disciplinary action taken per 1,000 lawyers regardless 
of cut score. See Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20. Linear Fit and R2 Value for the Number of  




4. Implications of the Finding of No Correlation Between Cut Score and Complaints, 
Charges, or Disciplinary Action  
 
Examination of whether a high cut score reduced the number of complaints filed, attorneys 
charged, or attorneys subjected to disciplinary action revealed no significant relationship 
between the cut score chosen and discipline system activity. The data suggests no causal or 
predictive relationship between high cut scores and public protection as measured by 
disciplinary statistics. 
 
There are some limitations to using this type of disciplinary data as the proxy for attorney 
competence. One concern is that jurisdictions use very different disciplinary and investigative 
processes and allocate varying amounts of funding to their respective disciplinary systems. It 
is possible that these differences might account for the lack of significance in Figure 19 and 




However, the public complaint data in Figure 18 represented an index of the public’s 
perception of harm caused by attorneys in that jurisdiction, expressed as complaints per 
1,000 licensed attorneys. The simple filing of a complaint is disconnected from disciplinary 
system funding, prosecutorial investigations, or adjudicatory processes. Therefore, in the 
absence of any other objective data related to measuring public protection across 
jurisdictions, the number of complaints filed is a reasonable and clear proxy for measuring 
whether the public of that jurisdiction feels protected from attorney incompetence or ethical 
misbehavior. Summarizing six years of complaint data from up to 48 jurisdictions, Figure 18 
indicates that there is no statistically significant relationship between high cut scores and this 
measure of public protection. 
 
An additional consideration is the possibility that differences in jurisdictional culture affected 
the number of complaints filed by consumers of legal services in a given jurisdiction. Such 
cultural differences could include the perception that complaints are not acted upon, a more 
aggressive consumer protection environment, a fear of retaliation, or a sense that the act of 
complaining is an admission of client fault or incompetence. Using consumer complaints as a 
measure of incompetence also assumes clients are accurate assessors of attorney 
competence. However, considering the breadth of the data and the general similarities among 
populations and discipline systems, it would be difficult to quantify and measure how 
differences among jurisdictional attitudes and client expectations might impact complaint 
filing. As Figures 18, 19, and 20 illustrate, there were differences, both year to year within the 
same jurisdiction and between jurisdictions in the same year. But in the aggregate, over this 
large data set and long time frame, no significant relationship between high cut scores and 
attorney discipline can be observed.   
 
The results of the analysis of disciplinary data in the context of jurisdictional cut scores is not 
intended to measure whether there is a relationship between an individual attorney’s score on 
the CBX and their future risk of unprofessional or unethical behavior. However, the data 
clearly indicate that from the standpoint of how jurisdictions regulate licensed attorneys, there 
is no statistical relationship suggesting that jurisdictions with higher cut scores have a lower 
incidence of complaints, charges, or disciplinary actions. Therefore, arguments that high cut 







V.  Selecting the California’s Cut Score is an Important Policy Decision that  
Should be Informed by Data on Racial Disparity and Disciplinary Rate 
 
The State Bar of California’s mission is to protect the public and includes the primary 
functions of licensing, regulating, and disciplining attorneys; the advancement of the ethical 
and competent practice of law; and supporting efforts to create greater access to, and 
inclusion in, the legal system for minorities.55 The CBX and the policies related to exam 
content, format, scoring, and cut score play a crucial role in each of these primary 
responsibilities. 
 
A. Public Protection Policy 
 
Historically, the presumption that maintaining one of the highest cut scores in the nation 
provided the highest level of public protection has played a prominent role in both rhetoric and 
policy making in California. If true, this could be a valid, rational reason for setting a high cut 
score standard. However, at least as measured by complaints, disciplinary charges, and 
disciplinary actions, that is not the case. At the same time, it is also now clear that California’s 
high cut score adversely impacts the number of minority applicants admitted to the 
profession.  
 
The CBX is one important part of a regulatory scheme for new attorneys, grounded in the 
need for public protection. The CBX determination of minimum competence is paired with a 
separate professional responsibility exam, specific and rigorous pre-licensing education 
requirements, and a moral character evaluation, all of which are intended, in concert, to 
assure that the public is protected from practitioners who do not have the minimum 
competence, and other skills, abilities and traits of character, to ethically and competently 
begin the practice of law 
 
This study is particularly valuable because no previous studies of the relevant data in any 
jurisdiction have assessed specific cut scores as measures of the CBX’s racial impacts on 
eventual passers and never passers. Furthermore, no previous studies assessed the 
relationship between cut scores and the incidence of discipline by cut score across multiple 
jurisdictions. Both of these analyses offer important public protection insights highly relevant 
 




for policymakers to make effective and valid decisions related to establishing the appropriate 
cut score for a specific jurisdiction. 
 
A logical relationship should exist between cut scores in the range used by states and 
competence, and between competence and the incidence rate of discipline (complaints, 
charges filed, and actions). If there were a protective effect of higher cut scores, some 
relationship with disciplinary statistics would be expected to exist. However, as reported to the 
ABA, during the period studied, no such statistically significant relationship existed, and in 
fact, the data points slightly toward the opposite relationship (states with higher cut scores 
and a greater rate of complaints, charges and actions). The fact that no statistically significant 
relationship existed between the choice of cut score and disciplinary complaints raises 
significant doubt about whether public protection is a rational basis for maintaining a particular 
cut score, especially when high cut scores also have the disparate racial effects reported in 
this study. This is an important finding that should be valuable to policymakers when 
considering other possible implications of using high cut scores to restrict attorney licensure. 
  
B. Diversity of the Profession Policy 
 
Access to justice, and inclusion in the legal system, are primary policy missions of the State 
Bar and the Court.56 Increasing diversity of the profession is expected to improve both access 
and inclusion, and this cannot be accomplished without admitting more minority attorneys.57 If 
the selection of the cut score for the CBX has a statistically significant disparate impact on 
 
56 Supreme Court of California Issues Statement on Equality and Inclusion, California Courts: The Judicial Branch of California, California Courts 
Newsroom, June 11, 2020, https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/news/supreme-court-of-california-issues-statement-on-equality-and-inclusion, (last 
visited Aug. 22, 2020). “We state clearly and without equivocation that we condemn racism in all its forms: conscious, unconscious, institutional, 
structural, historic, and continuing. We say this as persons who believe all members of humanity deserve equal respect and dignity; as citizens 
committed to building a more perfect Union; and as leaders of an institution whose fundamental mission is to ensure equal justice under the law for 
every single person. In our profession and in our daily lives, we must confront the injustices that have led millions to call for a justice system that 
works fairly for everyone. Each member of this court, along with the court as a whole, embraces this obligation. As members of the legal profession 
sworn to uphold our fundamental constitutional values, we will not and must not rest until the promise of equal justice under law is, for all our 
people, a living truth.” 
57 “Having a diverse legal profession positively impacts the administration of justice, ensures fairness, and promotes the rule of law. The mandate to 
promote a diverse and inclusive legal profession is central to the State Bar’s mission of public protection. See Report Card on the Diversity of the 






“ The fact that no statistically significant relationship existed between 
the choice of cut score and disciplinary complaints raises significant 
doubt about whether public protection is a rational basis for 
maintaining a particular cut score, especially when high cut scores  
also have the disparate racial effects reported in this study.” 
access to the profession on the basis of race and ethnicity, that impact should be an 
important consideration for policymakers.58  
 
California’s recent decision to lower the cut score to 1390 moved California from having the 
second-highest cut score to the fourth-highest cut score. However, at 1390, California 
remains at the 93.8th percentile of all cut scores. See Figure 21. More importantly, these data 
established that 1390 will continue the long-standing pattern of significant, divergent passing 
rates between Whites and minorities on the CBX. Although these data reflected that each 
reduction of the cut score increased the number of minority passers, the use of 1390 would 
have had only a modest quantitative impact over the period studied. At 1390, the CBX would, 
and will, continue to produce significantly disparate pass rates on the basis of race and 
ethnicity when compared to the national median cut score of 1350, the New York standard of 
1330, and the simulated model of 1300. 
 
The study data show that the choice of cut score relates directly to eventual passing rates, 
and lower cut scores produce more racially and ethnically comparative passing rates.  If 1300 
had been adopted as the cut score in 2009, 1,154 more Black, 1,709 more Hispanic/Latinx, 
and 2,930 more Asian lawyers would have been admitted to practice in California. If 1350 had 
been adopted, 753 more Black attorneys, 1,162 more Hispanic/Latinx attorneys, and 1,961 
more Asian attorneys would have been admitted to the practice in California. At 1390, 294 
more Black, 501 more Hispanic/Latinx attorneys, and 880 more Asian attorneys would have 




58 See Howarth, Joan W., The Professional Responsibility Case for Valid and Nondiscriminatory Bar Exams, 33 Geo. J. of Legal Ethics 931, 958 
(2020), available at https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/1294 (exam validity and nondiscrimination goals support cut score of 1300 as currently 








Figure 21 illustrates the distribution and range of current cut scores across all jurisdictions.59 
The lowest cut score is currently in Wisconsin at 1290 and the highest cut score is currently in 
Delaware at 1450 (for comparison purposes adjusting the cut scores to the 2000 point scale 
used in this study vs. the 200 point scale used by the NCBE). The median of the national 
range of scores is 1350. 
 
C. Application of the Study to Policy Making 
 
The purpose of this study is not to recommend which cut score is appropriate for California, 
nor to explain why passing rates are racially and ethnically disparate at different cut scores. 
As previously stated, the establishment of a cut score is a policy decision made by each 
jurisdiction based on many different policy considerations. This study provides policy makers 
with relevant and previously unavailable empirical data and analyses to assist in policy 
decisions that may be influenced by the relationship between cut scores, public protection, 
and disparate impact on the basis of race and ethnicity. 
 
Confidence in the legal system is essential to the protection of the rule of law, and a bar 
licensee population representative of the people of California will help build confidence that 
 
59 NCBE Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements 2020, Chart 10 at p. 36-37. 





there is one system of equal justice for all Californians.60 The authors of this study hope that 
this analysis provides a better understanding of the important relationship between cut scores 
and racial representation in the bar licensee population, and provides valuable data 
suggesting that high cut scores do not reduce or prevent the incidence of attorney 
misconduct. It is hoped that the empirical data, not unsupported rhetoric, informs the policy-
making decisions on setting an equitable and appropriate cut score. 
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